There has been much conversation about what the framers of the Constitution intended to be impeachable. First , they limited to just Treason and Bribery only the crimes that were impeachable. But George Mason of Virginia want to add Maladministration as an impeachable offense James Madison argued that to do that it would give the Senate a from of control and they could easily remove a President. Benjamin Franklin had warned about allowing Congress too much control over the President and to ensure there was oversight but only for High Crimes and Misdemeanors. Thus Madison suggestion for a clause included " High Crimes and Misdemeanors" which was understood to mean gross misadministration and one overt act that would be a crime under federal law. Notice that it did not allow for recall by the senate upholding an impeachment in the house on regular occurrences Finally Treason was defined as "overt acts to aid a wartime enemy".
New York’s Gouverneur Morris stood to say that arguments in favor of impeachment had convinced him “of the necessity of impeachments.
"Our executive may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust, and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard against it by displacing it…. The executive ought to be impeachable for treachery; corrupting his electors, and incapacity. He should be punished not as a man but as an officer and punished only by degradation from his office. "
Thus High Crimes and Misdemeanors is just what it says unless a crime had been committed it is not impeachable and such crimes should be of a serious nature and punished if found guilty by only removal from office .
Finally Benjamin Franklin weighed in
As fruitless back-and-forth exchanges turned into a chorus of catcalls, all eyes turned to the venerable Benjamin Franklin for help:
“What was the practice before in cases where the chief magistrate rendered himself obnoxious?” asked the aging sage rhetorically. With his spectacles balanced precariously near the tip of his nose, he feigned careful thought, then answered his own question:
Why, recourse was had to assassination in which he was not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It would be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.
As collective laughter filled the hall, tension eased, and Virginia’s diminutive James Madison, a planter’s son, joined the debate:
It is indispensable that some provision be made for defending the community against incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of the chief magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service is not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers.
South Carolina planter Charles Cotesworth Pinckney drawled that he could not see “or understand the need for any sort of impeachments.” The power to impeach would allow the legislature to hold “as a rod over the executive and by that means destroy his independence.”
Thus even then it was a real problem to define what exactly was an impeachable offense but they all were leary of making the office of President under the control of Congress at any time but independent unless a most foul crime is committed.
